Stacy Bartels covers a talk given by Joan Hoff Wilson regarding the historical and political significance of the Watergate scandal. Printed in The Dickinsonian in April 1983, this article expresses concerns about the implications of this scandal only ten years after its occurrence.
Joan Hoff Wilson, a professor of history at Indiana University, delivered a speech here Tuesday evening on Watergate and its aftermath. Ms. Wilson is also the Director of the Organization of American History and the author of a number of books.
Wilson is currently “working as rapidly as (she) can” on a book about the legacy of Watergate and Nixon’s policies. She hopes to have it published in time to “hit the anniversary of his resignation from office.”
Professor Wilson began her lecture by stating a few commonly held conceptions of Watergate and by discussing her own generally thoughts on the subject. She presented some basic questions to the audience hoping that through answering them she could also answer the most important question of all: What can we learn from Watergate?”
According to Wilson, there are four ways one may interpret the Watergate incident: 1) In the literal sense, which is to “look at the actual break-in;” 2) In a common way, which includes “studying the discovery of the break-in and its repercussion;” 3) To interpret it looking at the atmosphere it created, “the general disillusionment and cynicism that came to tarnish the idealism of our government;” and 4) Interpreting the incident through the “general abuses” that came from it.
Wilson sees “several layers” to the whole Watergate incident and hopes that, “if we are really to learn, we don’t stop at the most simplistic layer. It (Watergate) is more than ‘Nixon simply got caught.’”
She views Watergate not as a unique incident but as the culmination of many cover-up jobs, which ultimately ended in national press coverage. She cited a few other examples of federal secrecy, such as Operation Mongoose, an attempt by the U.S. to overthrow Cuba and assassinate Castro, under the Kennedy administration.
The guest lecturer reviewed some of Nixon’s tactics and reasoning behind the tappings. He had been “onto the tappings since the beginning,” but he may have viewed such methods as the only way to win the domestic ‘war’ he was fighting with the ‘elite powers.’”
Wilson believes Nixon was faced with much opposition, especially from students who represented an up and coming power, and that he strove to “re-establish consensus at all levels of (society). He felt threatened and felt he had to do something about it.”
Wilson urged her audience to examine some factors behind Nixon’s activities and actions as president before judging these actions. She noted that Nixon entered as a war-time president and not only took on the problems of the Vietnam War but also inherited LBJ’s theory of a “Great Society,” which had already lost the faith of many. There was an increased public awareness concerning the Vietnam War. In this atmosphere, “the public was more critical of governmental processes” than ever before and this led to mounting disagreement among top officials. The Nixon administration was not so tightly bound.
Although she does not excuse Nixon, Wilson seemed to stress not so much his crime, but rather what has resulted from the whole issue. She feels there were noticeable effects in terms of American journalism. “Investigative reporting is now at a higher priority…and journalism as a whole has picked up.” But she also sees a negative side in the “great emphasis on anonymous sources to provide information for stories.”
Most importantly, Wilson believes that the whole Watergate incident has tightened up the government and its functions. It “restored greater Constitutional achievements and stronger foreign policies,” in attempt to have “the system working at its best.”
In closing, Wilson added that Watergate also increased need to concern and participation in our federal government. “The government much be accountable at all levels, to the people so that this demand for accountability will also remain for later generations.”
Instead of viewing Watergate as an unfortunate incident, Professor Wilson said, “Watergate can and should be viewed as an opportunity for improvement and a cure for the disease of the American body politic.” She fears that the read danger today is that “Watergate will remain more a placebo than a general cure.” In order to prevent this, Wilson suggests keeping all information about it alive with constant study and evaluation.
Although she does not deny the negative effects Watergate may have had on our nation, Wilson advised, if we are to remember it positively, we must think of it as the potential cure for a situation that had been getting out of hand,” and she notes that we must learn, as always, from our mistakes.