Syria has been in crisis since 2011, the death toll rapidly accelerating in a conflict that changed from peaceful protests to armed uprising to a full-blown civil war—exacerbated by sectarian rhetoric and tensions—and one of the worst refugee crises in a region sadly accustomed to them. So why is it only now that the president is asking Congress to authorize military action, and that Secretary Kerry is racking up air miles attempting to build even an approximate international consensus that such action is lawful and necessary?

The panel organized by the Clarke Forum last week suggests at least one answer: despite different perspectives and emphases, we found ourselves in clear agreement on one matter—the US Administration does not have a Syria policy.

Last week, the conflict passed a grim milestone. According to UN figures, two million Syrians are refugees, half of them children. Including the internally displaced, fully one third of Syria’s population is effectively homeless. Most of the refugees are in neighboring states, which are doing their best but inevitably struggling to cope with the vast influx of people. In the north of Jordan, the Zaatari refugee camp is now effectively the country’s fourth largest city. In Lebanon, which largely shares Syria’s mosaic of religious and ethnic groups, there are signs that sectarian tensions are flaring up.

If the United States and the international community were to do nothing else, they should (as Admiral Sestak said during the panel discussion) work to contain the conflict. This means offering security assistance to neighboring states and humanitarian assistance to refugees. The United States has promised significant humanitarian aid, but figures released by the UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and analyzed by the Guardian show many donors well ahead of the United States in actually delivering promised aid, with 56.5% of the US-pledged amount still not paid. The figures also show that as a proportion of GDP, the US contribution is modest, whereas it could be showing greater leadership. A Syria policy should start there.

The current crisis is not about Syria, but about the failure of US deterrence to prevent the use of chemical weapons. As anyone who has taken POSC/INST170 International Relations knows, if a country has to make good on a threat by actually using force, then deterrence has failed. To be effective, a deterrent threat must be clear, it must be severe, and it must be credible. The target of such a threat must understand as unambiguously as possible what behavior will provoke punishment. The punishment must be sufficiently devastating to change the calculations of the target government. And there should be no doubt that the punishment will be carried out. The president’s “red line” was a poorly executed attempt at deterrence.

Because these conditions were not met, we should not be surprised that the Syrian government has not been deterred from using sarin gas in increasing amounts (even while the exact circumstances of the most egregious attack, in the eastern suburbs of Damascus, are still not fully clear).

Why did our panel last week agree that some kind of US military strike had become more or less inevitable, whether or not that would achieve any significant objective in terms of the Syrian civil war? Because the United States needs to be able to deter other states. If the United States does not now follow through on its deterrent threat, however clumsily made, then there is a reasonable concern that its resolve will be tested elsewhere.

Ambassador Power, the US Permanent Representative to the United Nations and a well-known proponent of humanitarian intervention, laid out the case for action in a 6 September speech at the Center for American Progress. She argued that the United States cannot be the world’s policeman, which is clearly correct—an anarchic international system has no police force. But setting aside whatever responsibilities might be thought to go along with maintaining a military capability dwarfing all others, the security of the United States and its closest allies still depends in part on their ability to effectively deter other states from flouting international norms.

A limited military strike will do little for the Syrian people. The money would be better spent on relief for refugees. But unless the new Russian initiative succeeds reasonably quickly, the logic of deterrence means that the missiles will most probably fly.

1Sean Anderson and Michael Comerford. “Syrian humanitarian aid: which countries give what?” The Guardian Friday 6 September 2013 online:

The twenty-minute video can be found at http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews.